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

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Constructing Regionalism Domestically: Local Actors and Foreign Policymaking in Newly Democratized Indonesia*

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There is a dearth of studies exploring the construction of ideas on regionalism outside Europe. This article seeks to make a contribution to close this gap. It examines the construction of ideas on regionalism in Indonesia, the largest member country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Theoretically, the paper draws from Acharya's concept of "constitutive localization" which it develops further. It offers an alternative explanation to studies which argue that as a result of mimetic behavior, social learning, and cost-benefit calculations, regional organizations across the world become increasingly similar. While this may be the case in terms of rhetoric and organizational structure, it is not necessarily the case at a normative level. The Indonesian case shows that even though foreign policy stakeholders have increasingly championed European ideas of regional integration after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998, they have skillfully amalgamated them with older local worldviews through framing, grafting, and pruning. European ideas of regional integration thereby served to modernize and relegitimize a foreign policy agenda which seeks to establish Indonesia as a regional leader with ambitions to play a major role in global politics.

There is a dearth of studies exploring the domestic construction of ideas on regionalism outside Europe (Hurrell 2007:134).[1] This article seeks to make a contribution to close this gap by examining the construction of ideas on regionalism in Indonesia. The Southeast Asian archipelagic state is the largest member country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia's premier regional organization. In the article, I offer an alternative explanation to studies inspired by Europeanization research, which argue that as a result of mimetic behavior, social learning, and cost–benefit calculations, other regional organizations emulate the European model of regional integration. For them, this explains why regional organizations across the world become increasingly similar (i.a., Jetschke 2009; Börzel and Risse 2009). While conceding that this may be the case in terms of rhetoric and organizational structure, I claim that this is not

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[1]For other recent studies exploring the interface between Southeast Asian regionalism and domestic politics, see, among others, Emmerson (2008), Jones (2009), and Rüland (2009).

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necessarily the case at the normative level. The Indonesian example shows that even though foreign policy stakeholders have increasingly championed European ideas of regional integration after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997/1998, they have skillfully amalgamated them with older local worldviews. European ideas of regional integration thereby served to modernize and relegitimize a foreign policy agenda which seeks to establish Indonesia as a regional leader with ambitions to play a major role in global politics.

The article proceeds in six steps. Following the introduction, the second of these steps takes the form of a theoretical framework based on Acharya's theory of "constitutive localization" (Acharya 2004, 2009). In the third step, I briefly outline the pre-existing normative orthodoxy, the "cognitive prior" (Acharya 2009), shaping ASEAN's regional identity, the doctrinal foundations, and actual practices of Indonesia's foreign policy prior to the AFC. Step four identifies the AFC as a watershed for Indonesian perceptions of ASEAN. The crisis severely eroded existing beliefs and expectations associated with the ASEAN Way as the grouping's established repository of cooperation norms and gave rise to normative challenges seemingly inspired by European regionalism. Step five examines how Indonesian foreign policy stakeholder groups respond to the external ideational challenge. As empirical background serves the Indonesian ratification debate of the ASEAN Charter in 2008, which seeks to adjust the cooperation norms of the grouping to a rapidly changing regional and global environment. I argue in this section that although the external ideas associated with the European model of regional integration have been rhetorically appropriated by the main protagonists in the Indonesian discourse, they have been localized in various ways and to varying degrees. Indonesian foreign policy stakeholders have framed foreign ideas on regionalism in ways which make them compatible with nationalism as the firmly entrenched key norm and practice of the country's foreign policy. By linking Indonesian nationalism with European norms of regional integration, they do not only revitalize Indonesian regional leadership claims, but also modernize and revalidate Indonesian nationalism and endow it with fresh legitimacy. The sixth section summarizes the main arguments and provides a short outlook on the future course of Indonesian foreign policy.

Theoretical and Methodological Premises

My claim that Indonesian nationalism localizes European norms of regional integration finds its theoretical support in the work of Jack Snyder.[2] Snyder argues that newly democratizing countries are especially susceptible to the appeal of nationalism (Snyder 2000). In non-Western regions, two factors account for this phenomenon: First, the historical legacies of decolonization and, second, the mode of democratic transition. In countries like Indonesia, which had to fight a war of independence entailing great human and material sacrifices, nationalist ideology tends to be deeply entrenched in the nation's collective memory. Additionally, in "pacted transitions," which are typical of the majority of "third wave" democracies including Indonesia, the domestic power equation is in flux, they are characterized by an intense competition between old and new elites. In the absence of strong and mature democratic institutions, and due to the historical legacies mentioned above, even reformist forces have no alternative but to resort to nationalist populism in order to mobilize popular support. Competing elites, outbidding each other in nationalist rhetoric, thus also transform foreign policy-making into an issue area where protecting national self-interest becomes an important benchmark for political success.

[2] This paragraph follows Rüland (2009).

Regional integration and related institution-building entail important constraints and opportunities for foreign policymakers. This elevates concepts of regional order to a key domain of national legitimacy discourses and the associated debates on a country's "self-positioning" as a member of the international community. It is here where, in the Indonesian context, the old norms of Southeast Asian regional cooperation embodied in the ASEAN Way are being challenged with new European-inspired ideas of regional integration in the post-Asian crisis era and where, as a consequence, on a theoretical and methodological level, foreign policy analysis will benefit from norm diffusion theory.

The latter's strength is its ability to shed light on the cognitive dimension of institution-building. It focuses on the norms, ideas, and values underlying regional cooperation arrangements and how they change over time. These norms are regarded as socially constructed, the result of discursive interaction. Constructivist norm diffusion literature offers a potentially greater explanatory scope than other approaches as it transcends the Cartesian instrumental logic of rationalist theories, both in their realist as well as institutionalist variants. By endogenizing change and by focusing on the appropriateness of norms, constructivist norm diffusion theory facilitates tracing the ideational roots of institutions, exploring their evolution, capturing their cultural peculiarities, and conceptualizing the cognitive dimension of power (that is, "productive power") (Barnett and Duvall 2005).

Research on norm diffusion has particularly been thriving in the field of Europeanization studies. Originally focussing on the question of the extent to which the new Eastern European member states have adopted the norms, rules and practices propagated by the European Union in the process of accession, more recent studies also cover the interaction of regional organizations. They argue that by actively exporting its norms and values to and being emulated by other regional organizations, the European Union has become a "normative power" (Manners 2002) or even a "transformative power" (Börzel and Risse 2009).

One of the merits of the "transformative power of Europe" literature is that it has revealed that many non-Western regional groupings have indeed adopted the European Union's organizational nomenclature and that often this appropriation is paralleled by glaring rhetoric–action gaps (Jetschke 2009). Yet these studies rarely make an effort to explain these rhetoric–action gaps as a result of normative deviation from the European model. This traps them in the fallacy that the rhetorical adoption of European norms predicates a transformative process and homogenization of regional organizations. What they fail to see is how and to what extent norm recipients reinterpret imported European norms, and thereby more or less subtly undermine the transformative power ascribed to Europe.

The most suitable approach providing the analytical tools for transcending transformative rhetoric is third-generation norm diffusion research. Acharya's theory of "constitutive localization" attaches agency not only to external norm entrepreneurs but also to local norm recipients (Acharya 2004, 2009). "Constitutive localization" thereby transcends the state-centrism of earlier constructivist theorizing. It accommodates the criticism that constructivist studies, like neorealism, often treat states as unitary actors (Landolt 2004:581). Open for the study of domestic policy processes, localization theory may shed light into the proverbial black box of foreign policymaking and adds a bottom-up dimension to the dominant top-down and outward-in perspective in the construction of norms and institutional change in non-Western regions.

Most importantly, however, it perceives normative change as a process with varying outcomes. Local norm recipients rarely fully reject or completely adopt new external norms (Acharya 2004, 2009). More likely it is that norm recipients reconstruct external norms in a way that matches locally existing norms. They

adjust the new norms to the normative orthodoxy, thereby modernizing the latter and endowing the old order with fresh legitimacy. The result is a normative third, although the new set of amalgamated norms may be closer to the ideational orthodoxy than the novel external norms. Crucial for localization is that there be sufficient political space for an open public discourse allowing normative contestation.

Localization is thus not merely a transitional stage in a transformative trajectory, dissociating it from the modernization theory-driven early norm diffusion literature with its universalist teleological perspective, liberal ontology, and "cosmopolitan proselytism" (Acharya 2009:10). Rather it is a complex process of normative adjustment in which local actors deliberately make the new external norms and ideas congruent with the normative orthodoxy in order to pursue their own policy agenda. But not only local norm recipients localize, as Acharya suggests: foreign norm entrepreneurs may also do so in a pre-emptive strategy to make the new norms more palatable to the targeted recipients if these are expected to reject them. Another complication occurs, when *local* change agents expect strong resistance to the novel (external) ideas they promote. Rather than directly promoting the new ideas, they seek to legitimize them by stressing the virtues of the extant ideas. And, finally, as the Indonesian case shows, local norm recipients may even become external norm entrepreneurs themselves by trying to project newly localized norms into the wider region.[3]

Norm localization as a strategic procedure underpinning foreign policy formulation may be analytically dissected in a three-pronged process which entails "framing, grafting and pruning" (Acharya 2004, 2009). It should, however, be made clear that here, in contrast to other approaches using framing analysis (in media studies, organizational studies, and social movement studies), the concept of "framing" concerns only a minor part of the broader process of localization and normative change. Framing, as it is understood here, is (only) a form of "frame articulation" (Benford and Snow 2000) in which issues are highlighted and created "by using language that names, interprets and dramatizes them" (Acharya 2004:243). This interpretative process also includes what others have described as the "diagnostic" and "prognostic" functions of frames (Acharya 2004:243). Therefore, in a first step, I look at the evaluative connotations which are being used in framing the normative challenge to the idea of how regional cooperation should work to secure national foreign policy goals.

Yet, the analysis of normative change in the process of transcultural ideational flows has to include two additional elements. Grafting is "a tactic norm entrepreneurs employ to institutionalize a new form by associating it with a pre-existing norm in the same issue area" (Acharya 2004:244), and pruning denotes a process of "selecting those elements of the new norm which fit the pre-existing normative structure and reject those which do not" (Acharya 2004:242–251).

In terms of methodology, I trace these three dimensions of the localization process (framing, pruning, and grafting) by systematically analyzing the content of statements by six foreign policy stakeholder groups consisting of legislators, the academe, representatives of advocacy NGOs including labour unions, members of the business community, the (print) media, and the government. Government representatives primarily include the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, diplomats, and, to a lesser extent, other cabinet members and senior officials. These stakeholders are not only central in the Indonesian foreign policy discourse; I also expect them to be important localizers. Straddling the global and the local, they are knowledgeable of both worlds and thus well-positioned intermediaries (Shawki 2011:4).

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[3] A process, Acharya has recently called "norm subsidiarity" (Acharya 2011).

I gathered my sources feeding into the qualitative content analysis by triangulating expert interviews, which were conducted during field trips to Indonesia in March/April 2010 and August 2010[4]; a comprehensive newspaper analysis; the analysis of websites; and a thorough literature review. Interviews conducted in 2010 in Singapore with government representatives, (former) ASEAN Secretariat officials, and scholars focussed on the *alter*-part of Indonesia's foreign policy identity. In other words, these interviews served as a reality check of Indonesian views by trying to identify how external observers evaluate Indonesian stakeholders' perceptions of Southeast Asian regionalism and Indonesia's role in it.

For the newspaper analysis, I selected 173 articles and interviews with foreign policy actors from English-language newspapers such as *The Jakarta Post* and *The Jakarta Globe* as well as *Bahasa Indonesia* dailies, including *Kompas, Suara Pembaruan, Media Indonesia, Republika,* and *Jawa Pos*. Articles also stemmed from news magazines such as *Tempo Interaktif, Gatra,* and *Kabar Bisnis* and, finally, from the Indonesian government news agency *Antara* and the Internet news portal *DetikNews*. The distribution across the six stakeholder groups is uneven, to some extent reflecting the intensity of their involvement in the debate. Not unexpectedly, the most prolific contributors were members of the academe (87), followed by representatives of the government (37), advocacy NGOs (23), the media (13), the business sector (7), and legislators (5). However, the lack of articles authored by legislators is compensated by the fact that the Indonesian media are replete with interview statements of parliamentarians, even though the mediation of views through the media may result in biases and distortions. Here, the numerous interviews conducted in the predecessor project served as a countercheck against potentially misleading reporting.

Selected were articles on the ASEAN Charter, Southeast Asian regionalism and Indonesian foreign policy, and op-ed articles authored by, and newspaper interviews with, representatives of the six stakeholder groups. These articles were derived from the online archives of the respective newspapers. The articles were subjected to two rounds of qualitative content analysis, one round pursuing a deductive approach, and a second one an inductive approach.

In the deductive analysis, I departed from the assumption that like any regional organization, ASEAN may be perceived as a system of regional governance. The governance literature attaches three key functions to governance: security, welfare, and rule (Czempiel 1981). Assuming further that Indonesian stakeholders frame their views related to regionalism and the ASEAN Charter in reference to these three key functions, I scrutinized the texts along these three dimensions.

In a second round of analysis, I chose an inductive approach with the objective of, first, cross-checking the results of the first round of text interpretation and, second, finding keywords linking the identified interpretations of regionalism with the "cognitive prior." This procedure sought to identify the concepts and ideas used for creating the ideational nexus between the new ideas and the "cognitive prior" (grafting) and for making old and new norms compatible through cutting some elements from the new ideas and the ideational orthodoxy (pruning). Important keywords identified in this second interpretative round included "free and active," "survival" and "undergoing difficult times," "national interest," "soft power," "leadership," "sovereignty," the "largest country of Southeast Asia/ASEAN," and notions of "people's economy."

[4] The study also draws from interviews conducted during a previous research project on the role of parliaments in military reform which, touching upon security and foreign policy issues, provided useful background information. This project was funded by the German Peace Foundation (DSF).

The "Cognitive Prior:" ASEAN and Indonesian Foreign Policy

The current Indonesian debate on the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN's relevance for Indonesia's external relations cannot be understood without recourse to the norms, ideas, and practices previously guiding Southeast Asian regional cooperation and Indonesia's foreign policy. This "cognitive prior" (Acharya 2009:21–23) has become part of Indonesians' collective memory and tells us what is considered appropriate and hence legitimate. The more resilient these established ideas, norms, and practices are, the less likely is wholesale normative transformation and the more likely is it that norm recipients either reject or localize external normative challenges.

The ASEAN Way: A Southeast Asian Regional Agenda

ASEAN was founded in August 1967 after two earlier attempts at regional cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo, had faltered in the wake of the Indonesian confrontation policy *(konfrontasi)* against neighboring Malaysia. One way of rebuilding the international trust Indonesia had lost through *konfrontasi* and at the same time curtailing Great Power influence in Southeast Asia was the formation of a new regional organization (Weinstein 1976; Leifer 1983). ASEAN's founding document, the Bangkok Declaration, thus made the establishment of peaceful intraregional relations a major objective. A peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations, ASEAN's founding fathers believed, creates favorable conditions for economic growth and political stability which, in turn, would curtail the threat of communist expansion in the region.

Although the first decade of ASEAN was overshadowed by serious crises, the association remained intact. After the communist victory in Indochina in 1975, regional cooperation intensified. Crucial in this respect was the grouping's first summit held in 1976 in Bali. One of the summit's major outcomes was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which subsequently became a regional code of conduct. Building on the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung and the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, the TAC accentuated Westphalian norms of national sovereignty (Acharya 2009), including mutual respect for independence, equality, territorial integrity, national identity, non-interference into the internal affairs of other states, and the renunciation of threat and the use of force (Haacke 2003:6).

After the end of the Cold War, ASEAN's Westphalian norms came under siege. The new world order propagated by US President George H.W. Bush explicitly championed liberal values. Western governments subsequently began to tie development aid to progress in democratization, human rights, good governance, rule of law, and development orientation. Southeast Asia's mostly authoritarian regimes responded defensively to these conditionalities which they regarded as interference in their internal affairs. Buoyed by their unprecedented economic success and in anticipation of a "Pacific Century," they vociferously rejected the universalist liberal agenda. To counter the Western normative offensive, they constructed a distinctly East Asian political identity based on a set of values putatively shared by the societies of the region. These "Asian values" relished authority, power, and hierarchy and prioritized collective socioeconomic rights over individual political rights (Mahbubani 1993).

The exceptionalist claims associated with Asian political culture reinvigorated the sovereignty norms enshrined in the TAC. They sharpened notions of a unique Southeast Asian regionalism which explicitly dissociated ASEAN from the Western "other" embodied in the European model of regional integration. While the European Union pursues regional integration through the pooling of sovereignty and "deep" institutionalization, the ASEAN Way as the repository of

ASEAN cooperation norms stands for intergovernmentalism and "soft" institutionalization. ASEAN member governments regarded bureaucratization, "thick" institutions, and legalization of regional cooperation as serious obstacles to respond quickly and flexibly to the challenges of globalization and to reach pragmatic solutions for regional problems. The aversion to legalization and institutionalization found its equivalence in the non-binding nature of ASEAN decisions. Compliance with decisions was voluntary and enforcement relied on peer pressure. Derived from Malay village culture, the ASEAN Way calls for deliberation and consensual decisions *(musyawarah dan mufakat)*. Quiet diplomacy and compromise thus take precedence over confrontational bargaining. In order to maintain social harmony, ASEAN member governments tended to bracket contentious issues which they either relegated to the bilateral level or shifted to non-official "track-two" dialogues. Finally, in order to build confidence among highly diverse members, the ASEAN Way relies on "relationship-building" (Ba 2009:4), elevating close personal ties among leaders and officials and informality to significant norms in the ASEAN Way's ideational orthodoxy (Dosch 1994:9–10).

Independent and Active: Parameters of Indonesian Foreign Policy

The ideational foundations and practices of Indonesian foreign policy are deeply nationalist. For the majority of Indonesian politicians, power is the driving factor in IR (Weinstein 1976:63), a worldview reflecting the vicissitudes of Indonesia's history. Adverse experiences such as the waxing and waning of precolonial empires and kingdoms; the colonial trauma (Weinstein 1976:356); the Japanese occupation during the Second World War (1942–1945); the armed struggle for independence (1945–1949); the exigencies of the Cold War; and the seeming capitalist exploitation of the developing world by the economically advanced countries all inculcated in Indonesian leaders a deep distrust toward a seemingly hostile external world, a profound sense of vulnerability and victimization (Weinstein 1976:30), and great sensitivity to global and regional power shifts.

This power-sensitive worldview already shaped precolonial geopolitical conceptualizations of the external world. Inspired by Javanese variants of the ancient Indian *Arthasastra* (a political guide book for rulers), this thinking perceives the world as ordered in concentric circles *(mandalas)*. The court of the ruler is the center of this system. His neighbors, that is, the circle of kingdoms surrounding him, are the natural enemies, while in the next circle the neighbors of the neighbors are putative allies. Combined with perceptions of power as indivisible and amoral (Anderson 1972), the perseverance of these ideas must be attributed to the fact that the Indianized precolonial empires of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit century represent Indonesia's glorious past. For many politicians, Indonesia is a continuation of these two empires (Suryadinata 1996:6). As a "usable past," the myths surrounding Majapahit still give inspiration and guidance to contemporary policymakers. In the process, they unwittingly reproduce the political ideas of this past.

Modern conceptualizations of political realism further revalidate these ideas.[5] The armed forces in particular continue to use the geopolitical lens for identifying security threats. Trained in the writings of geopolitical thinkers ranging from Ratzel and Kjellen to Haushofer (Sunardi 2004) and familiar with the ideational representations of the Majapahit era, military strategists of the Suharto regime devised for Indonesia a foreign policy doctrine of concentric circles in which Indonesian domestic politics was the inner circle, followed by a second circle

[5] See also Indonesian diplomat Siswo Pramono in *The Jakarta Post*, March 4, 2010.

including Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbors and Australia and a third circle the remainder of the globe (Anwar 1994; Widjajanto 2008).

In order to contain the potential threats emanating from the immediate Southeast Asian neighborhood, Indonesia has made ASEAN the cornerstone of its foreign policy (Anwar 1994:7). It reflects the belief that "geographic proximity does not ensure easy relations between neighboring countries."[6] Yet Indonesia does not pursue traditional military balancing with countries of the third circle to contain security threats emanating from the second circle, but by incorporating its neighbors into a regional order led by Indonesia. In this vein, ASEAN is not only an organization intended to create a peaceful international environment conducive for economic development and to bestow respectability and credibility on Indonesia's foreign policy. It is also an institutional device to preempt threats in the immediate neighborhood and to keep Great Powers out of the region.

Another ideational root of Indonesia's realist foreign policy outlook is collectivist state theory. Indonesia's nationalist leaders skillfully amalgamated European and local conceptualizations of an organic state (Reeve 1985; Simanjuntak 1989; Bourchier 1999) which found its most elaborated embodiment in the corporatist order of Suharto's New Order regime (MacIntyre 1994). In order to unite the population for modernization from above, developmental states are prone to establish a state corporatist order. As late development is also a process combating international power asymmetries, these states tend to pursue an unequivocally nationalist foreign policy (Schmitter 1979:120).

The deep-seated power-conscious worldview of Indonesian politicians and IR scholars almost by definition entails a nationalist foreign policy (Anwar 1994:17). It is thus hardly surprising that "national interest" is the most frequently cited category in the Indonesian foreign policy discourse. Foremost in this respect figures national sovereignty, which Indonesian governments pursue by a combination of struggle *(perjuangan)* and diplomacy *(diplomasi)* (Leifer 1983:19; Anwar 1994:25). In Indonesian eyes, this is not a recipe for an aggressive foreign policy, but one in which, if diplomacy fails to accomplish its ends, Indonesia is also prepared to fight for its national interest, including—as *ultima ratio*—the use of military force.

Ever since Vice President Mohammed Hatta's famous 1948 speech, a nationalist foreign policy has been one that is "free and active" *(bebas dan aktif)* (Leifer 1983:27; Anwar 1994:36). Although originally the *bebas-aktif* doctrine sought to isolate Indonesia from the Cold War superpower competition, its meaning soon expanded and has become synonymous with autonomy and self-reliance. "Passivity," writes Weinstein, "connotes acquiescence to circumscribed independence" (Weinstein 1976:189). For Indonesia, an independent foreign policy is thus a matter of self-respect and dignity (Weinstein 1976:30).

A free and active foreign policy does not only stand for foreign policy pragmatism (Sukma 1995:308). Even more important is *bebas-aktif* for Indonesia's self-styled role of a regional leader and major player in world politics. Indonesians base their country's leadership claims primarily on their history, large territory, and population size, combined with the geopolitical and ethnocentric argument, that the country is the "nail of the universe." Yet, as Weinstein argued, the leadership which Indonesian foreign policy elites envisaged had very little concrete content. Leadership was equated with having a sphere of influence, being consulted by neighbors on developments of significance in the region, being a mediator in regional disputes and an agenda setter (Weinstein 1976:202). It contributed to a sense of frustrated entitlement that Indonesia's neighbors only reluctantly accorded the country the deference it expected from them. In times

[6] See *The Jakarta Post*, March 6, 2002.

of tension, this perceived lack of recognition could fuel shrill nationalist rhetoric in Indonesia's domestic politics.

The External Challenge: Europeanizing ASEAN?

The AFC of 1997/1998 was a watershed for ASEAN. The crisis had disastrous effects for the region's economies, comparable only to the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was precisely the external shock which the theoretical literature regards as trigger for fundamental ideational change (Legro 2000). It virtually paralyzed ASEAN, shattering the expectations associated with Asian values and the ASEAN Way. ASEAN's virtually non-existent crisis management forced Thailand and Indonesia to accept the tutelage of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to accept the latter's onerous conditionalities and infringements on their sovereignty. The AFC plunged ASEAN into its deepest crisis. For years, the grouping was in disarray. With old disputes and animosities breaking up anew, the future of Southeast Asian regionalism appeared gloomy (Rüland 2000).

As the contagion effects of the crisis had highlighted the growing interdependence of regional economies, and the subsequent haze pollution, the cross-border nature of many regional problems (Nguitragool 2011), external and local critics of the ASEAN Way began to target the non-interference norm as no longer functional. In July 1998, the then Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan proposed a relaxation of the non-interference norm through "flexible engagement." Although Surin's proposal was rejected, the ASEAN Way had come under siege. Academics and the media also criticized ASEAN's "soft" institutionalization as "fair weather cooperation" (Rüland 2000). They shifted attention to a widening rhetoric–action gap (Jones and Smith 2007; Jetschke and Rüland 2009) and the grouping's penchant for declaratory and symbolic politics.

ASEAN subsequently embarked on a strategy of damage control. Starting with the Hanoi Plan of Action (1998–2004), it initiated a flurry of activities designed to restore the grouping's cohesion. Interestingly, the ensuing reform debate, driven by academics, the media, and non-governmental organizations, increasingly tilted toward a European type of regional integration. At the Bali Summit of 2003, ASEAN responded to these pressures by broadening the normative foundation of the ASEAN Way. Norms hitherto prominently championed by the European Union such as democracy, human rights, good governance, rule of law, and the outlawing of military coups found their way into ASEAN documents such as the Bali Concord II and the Vientiane Action Program (2004–2010). The nomenclature of the organizational reforms initiated in Bali also exhibited affinities with European regionalism. In Bali, ASEAN leaders resolved to establish an ASEAN Community by 2020 (later accelerated to 2015) resting on three pillars (a security-political community, an economic community, and a sociocultural community) and to create a Single Market. Symptomatic of these changes was the fact that since Bali concepts such as "community" and "regional integration" have crept into ASEAN vocabulary, concepts which a decade earlier Southeast Asian governments avoided due to their affinity with European regionalism.[7]

At their 2005 Summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN leaders went one step further and decided to write an ASEAN Charter. Often likened to a constitution,[8] the Charter was expected to help deepen regional integration and transform ASEAN into a more cohesive, legalized, institutionalized, and rule-based organization. The ten eminent persons mandated by ASEAN leaders to produce a Charter blueprint with bold and visionary ideas travelled to Brussels to seek inspiration but negated an emulation of EU institutions. Yet, the Eminent Persons Group

[7] Statement of an ASEAN ambassador, Berlin, January 27, 2012.

[8] See, for instance, *Kompas,* June 7, 2007.

(EPG) report is the most far-reaching departure from the ASEAN Way and more than a mere rhetorical approximation to the European integration model. It proposed the establishment of an ASEAN Council as a major body of decision making, a committee of permanent representatives, the strengthening of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, and the transformation of ASEAN into a "people-oriented" organization (Jetschke 2009). Even more importantly, the report addressed ASEAN's rhetoric–action gap head on by referring to the grouping's poor implementation record.[9] As remedies, the report recommended an effective dispute settlement mechanism, compliance monitoring, and sanctions in case of non-compliance. Indonesian scholar Jusuf Wanandi went even further and called for the creation of an ASEAN Court of Justice.[10] All this raises the question: Is ASEAN moving toward a regionalism concept which is closely informed by the European Union and are Indonesian stakeholders supportive of such a development?

The "New ASEAN Way:" Localizing the External Normative Challenge

The aftermath of the AFC exposed Indonesian foreign policy stakeholders to ideas which many of them had rejected before as alien to the ASEAN Way. The following sections examine *how* and *to what extent* they have appropriated these new ideas about regional integration. I will argue that rather than fully adopting these ideas, they have localized them to varying degrees. Three reasons account for this claim: First, wholesale ideational transformation is—as argued in the theoretical section—highly conditional and hence occurs relatively infrequently. Second, localization is a likely response to external normative challenges if the new foreign ideas are confronted with a "cognitive" prior that is deeply entrenched in the collective memory of the recipient society. The ASEAN Way and the ideas, norms, and practices informing Indonesian foreign policy satisfy this criterion. And, third, localization is most likely to take place in political spaces which allow public discourse about new ideas. Newly democratic Indonesia also meets this requisite of localization. In accordance with Acharya's localization theory, the subsequent sections thus explore how, in the debate on the ASEAN Charter, Indonesian stakeholders framed the new ideas about regional integration and how they grafted and pruned them to make them compatible with the "cognitive prior" outlined earlier (Acharya 2009).

Framing the External Ideational Challenge

As "framing can make a global norm appear local" (Acharya 2009:13), Indonesian foreign policy stakeholders sought to frame post-Asian crisis ideas on regionalism in ways that make them acceptable to broad sections of society and help preserve the "cognitive prior." A closer look at the Indonesian debate of the ASEAN Charter reveals three major, albeit partly overlapping, interpretations of regionalism, largely consistent with the three deduced governance functions: First, a *security-related* interpretation which represents the ASEAN Charter as a response to global and regional power shifts. Second, a *democracy-based* interpretation including a strong emphasis of human rights relating the ASEAN Charter to global ideational shifts. Closely related to this democracy-based interpretation is, third, a *welfare- and social justice*–related interpretation, advocating people-centered regional governance as a precondition for transforming Southeast Asia into a socially more equitable and an ecologically more sustainable region.

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[9] Report of the Eminent Persons Group 2006, p. 4; see http://www.asean.org/19247.pdf (accessed September 5, 2011).

[10] *The Jakarta Post*, April 18, 2006.

The *security-oriented* interpretation is primarily found among academics and, here in particular, think tank researchers, and to a lesser extent in newspaper editorials. In view of these stakeholders, the main challenge facing Indonesia and, by coincidence, the rest of Southeast Asia, is the rapid rise of China and India. Jusuf Wanandi and Rizal Sukma, for instance, both leading scholars of the country's premier think tank, the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), unrelentingly intonated this theme. Even though doubts about China's benign intentions continue to linger in Indonesia's security community, Wanandi and Sukma are not projecting a future military threat. The challenge posed by the rise of China and India is chiefly perceived in geopolitical and geoeconomic terms, that is, the growing political and economic influence of these two giants on the Southeast Asian region. Indonesia and the region, they conclude, can only cope with these challenges if ASEAN is more than a "loose diplomatic institution and a limited economic entity."[11]

A more cohesive ASEAN presupposes a more consequent implementation of ASEAN decisions through greater compliance of member governments. ASEAN cooperation must increasingly rest on binding agreements, follow rules, and transcend the lowest common denominator. The need for greater governance effectiveness calls for institutional reforms which, in view of many academics, the Report of the EPG has well articulated. Foremost among these reforms are, in their view, the relaxation of ASEAN's non-interference norm, the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism, the possibility of imposing sanctions on non-complying members, majority voting to expedite decision making, a greater budget, and the transformation of ASEAN into a more people-centered organization.

The Charter version finally adopted greatly frustrated these scholars. For them, the Charter strongly diluted the EPG blueprint, limiting the prospects of transforming ASEAN into a regional organization in which "delivery instead of declaration" prevails.[12] As a result, in a parliamentary hearing, Wanandi and Sukma recommended the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) not to ratify the Charter.[13] Indonesia, argued Sukma, should leave the "golden cage" of ASEAN and break away from its long-cherished solidarity with the grouping. No longer should the association be the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy. Cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy must be its "national interest."[14] In what Sukma called a "post-ASEAN foreign policy,"[15] Indonesia should more rely on closer bilateral relations with Asia's rising powers, other forums in the Asia-Pacific such as the East Asian Summit (EAS), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and a still to be formed concert of major Asian powers, an Asian G8, a proposal first ventilated by Wanandi.[16] Beyond the region, Indonesia should strengthen its influence in the G20, the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), the Afro-Asian dialogue, and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM).[17]

NGO representatives, but also academics, journalists, and, to a lesser extent, legislators, framed their views of regionalism primarily as a narrative of *democracy*. NGO representatives especially discounted ASEAN as overly elitist and state-centered. They vociferously campaigned for a people-centered ASEAN in the

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[11] Sukma in *The Jakarta Post*, May 6, 2008; July 22, 2008.

[12] *The Jakarta Post*, December 21, 2009.

[13] Interview with a participant of the hearing, April 26, 2011, and *The Jakarta Post*, July 22, 2008.

[14] Wanandi in *The Jakarta Post*, November 3, 2008.

[15] *The Jakarta Post*, June 30, 2009.

[16] *The Jakarta Post*, November 3, 2008.

[17] Wanandi in *Kompas*, July 25, 2008, p. 7; similar: M.H.B. Wirajuda in *The Jakarta Post*, February 2, 2009, and May 26, 2009.

meetings they had with the EPG, the Charter-writing High-Level Task Force (HLTF), and at the annual meetings of civil society organizations such as the meanwhile deactivated ASEAN People's Assembly (APA) and the ongoing Asian Civil Society Conference/ASEAN People's Forum (ACSC/APF). NGOs demand institutional channels for regular interaction between ASEAN leaders and officials of the ASEAN Secretariat, on the one hand, and civil society, on the other.[18] While such demands entail the expectation that advocates for the poorer segments of ASEAN's member societies will be empowered to contribute in a meaningful way to the formulation of regional policies, it is surprising that ASEAN officialdom was able to inculcate their own evasive participatory rhetoric into even the NGOs' discourse. The often used term "people-centered" has been appropriated from the technocratic New Public Management literature used by bilateral and multilateral development donor organizations and entails an essentially top-down, efficiency-oriented perspective of participation.[19] Much more than "participation in decision-making," which may jeopardize technocratic effectiveness, the concept of "people-centeredness" entails "participation in implementation" (Cohen and Uphoff 1980) in which the population is mobilized to actively support programs propagated from above.

Like many NGO representatives, Charter critics in the academe also do not expect the Charter to transform ASEAN into a more people-centered organization. In Sukma's view, "many provisions in the Charter register a spirit of ASEAN as a leader-driven organization."[20] "The place of the people is nowhere to be found in the Charter. [.....] There is no provision in the Charter that establishes a mechanism by which the people could participate in the ASEAN process."[21] Wanandi's critique "that there is no article stating how society shapes ASEAN"[22] points in the same direction.

Legislators also critically noted that the Charter "does not clearly explain ASEAN's relationship with its peoples."[23] Interestingly, however, in contrast to NGO representatives, legislators failed to call for an "empowerment" of civil society in regional governance. No legislator is on record to have publicly demanded the "democratization" of ASEAN decision making. This may be attributed to the fact that even though the interaction between parliamentarians and civil society representatives has increased markedly in the post-1998 period, many lawmakers still have an ambiguous attitude toward civil society. They tend to regard civil society organizations as competitors for political influence, challenging their legitimacy as representatives of the people.

Apart from a more people-centered ASEAN, human rights figured high in the *democracy-oriented* interpretation. A major target of legislators' and NGO representatives' critique was the human rights mechanism envisaged by the Charter. Several legislators doubted that the Charter would foster a viable regional human rights regime. In the absence of an implementation mechanism, the human rights body was expected to be "toothless," lacking "clear guidelines of actions" and "a timeline when it should be formed."[24] Moreover, the human rights body would only allow promoting, not protecting human rights in the region, a point also emphasized by many ASEAN-critical NGOs.[25] Lawmakers thus charged that Indonesian negotiators had "surrendered" the regional human rights regime to

[18] Author's interview, March 26, 2010.
[19] See Korten (1984).
[20] *The Jakarta Post*, July 22, 2008.
[21] *The Jakarta Post*, July 22, 2008; see also Sukma (2010:47).
[22] *Kompas*, July 25, 2008, p. 6; see also Wanandi, *The Jakarta Post*, March 19, 2009.
[23] *Antara*, February 9, 2008.
[24] *The Jakarta Post*, February 6, 2008.
[25] See, for instance, KONTRAS representative Usman Hamid in *The Jakarta Post*, March 15, 2008.

Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, countries known for their controversial human rights records (Susilo 2010:66). As noted by legislator Djoko Susilo, the Charter does not address the question of "how the Burmese military junta can be persuaded to democratize the country and to improve its dismal human rights record."[26] Moreover, argued Djoko, without "rights protection and freedom of expression," ASEAN can hardly "become a people-oriented community."[27]

Many academics joined legislators' critique of the Charter's provisions on a regional human rights mechanism. In virtually all of their comments on the Charter, Wanandi and Sukma noted that the Charter does not provide for a credible regional human rights body.[28] One year later, Sukma found his misgivings corroborated in the tedious and acrimonious way in which a High-Level Panel (HLP) drafted the terms of reference for the envisaged ASEAN Human Rights Body.[29]

Finally, many NGO representatives, legislators, and business spokespersons framed their views on the ASEAN Charter in a primarily material dimension. What may be called a *welfare- and social justice*–oriented interpretation defined the utility of the Charter and ASEAN for the Indonesian people as the main benchmark for assessing the Charter's relevance. At stake here is who gets what and how much from ASEAN.

NGOs, for instance, debated intensively how the Charter impacts on ASEAN's economic agenda, to what extent it will facilitate distributive policies, and whether it will be ecologically sustainable. It is thus hardly surprising that many NGO voices criticized the putatively neoliberal economic bias embodied in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) project and its objective of creating a Single Market by 2015. Market opening, NGOs reasoned, will intensify foreign competition. The latter, in turn, jeopardizes the economic survival of local small-scale businesses, the backbone of the Indonesian economy. In May 2011, NGOs led by the Alliance for Global Justice eventually filed a judicial review of Law No. 38/2008 on the Ratification of the ASEAN Charter with the Constitutional Court, albeit without success. For the complainants, the Charter's provisions on an ASEAN Single Market were at variance with the economic nationalism promoted by the Indonesian Constitution.[30]

Surprisingly, legislators did not join NGOs in their opposition to the free-trade orientation of the Charter although the DPR had often taken a protectionist stance.[31] But they shared NGO views that, in particular, the less affluent segments of the Indonesian population pay the price for regional integration. A topic raised in this respect was Indonesian labor migration, certainly a critical concern given the fact that up to two million Indonesians work in neighboring Malaysia, many of them undocumented (Rüland 2009:383). Legislators also deplored that the Charter did not address other Indonesian grievances in its relations with its neighbors: the "theft of Indonesia's natural wealth,"[32] in particular illegal logging and the poaching of fish in its territorial waters, and the non-extradition of fugitives who have fled to Singapore in order to evade corruption charges in Indonesia.[33] In conclusion,

[26] *The Jakarta Post*, February 5, 2008.

[27] *The Nation*, March 1, 2009 http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/read.php?newsid=30096886&keyword=ASEAN+parliament (accessed February 18, 2010). Similar Djoko Susilo in *The Jakarta Post*, December 10, 2008.

[28] *The Jakarta Post*, June 30, 2009.

[29] *The Jakarta Post*, December 22, 2008, and interview, March 18, 2009.

[30] *Media Indonesia*, May 5, 2011.

[31] See, for instance, *The Jakarta Post*, March 12, 2001.

[32] PKS legislator Al Muzzamil Yusuf in *Kompas*, February 5, 2008, p. 11; similar Universitas Indonesia scholar Makmur Keliat in *Kompas*, August 30, 2010.

[33] *Kompas*, February 5, 2008, p. 11.

legislators conveyed to the public the message, often formulated in sweeping and populist language, that Indonesia is "on the receiving end in ASEAN matters."[34]

Academics largely abstained from evaluating the material benefits of the Charter for Indonesia. This may be attributed to the fact that, unlike politicians, they do not have to mobilize voters and thus have less need to resort to populist rhetoric. Surprising, however, was the silence of the business sector in the Charter debate. While economically outward-looking large firms seemed to be quite content with the Charter provisions on economic integration, the usually protectionist Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industries (KADIN) and the organizations representing small-scale businesses questioned the utility of ASEAN in rather general terms. Former KADIN Chairman M.S. Hidayat, for instance, noted that Indonesian businesspeople have not received the benefits they expected from ASEAN as the latter's decisions and policies are often "irrelevant to the development of the national economy" and "inapplicable in practice."[35] One reason for this seeming indifference toward the Charter is that most Indonesian business associations, including KADIN, have limited or no research capacities and are not very well equipped to anticipate the effects of economic policies. Moreover, as especially small- and medium-scale firms are in constant struggle to survive, their orientation is short term and *ad hocist*. They worry about the issues of the day, but much less about a Single Market which will be implemented 7 years after Charter ratification.

Grafting the New ASEAN Way

Grafting denotes in Acharya's localization theory the construction of a nexus between the old and the new ideas (Acharya 2004, 2009). In this section, I argue that the way in which the new external ideas on regionalism have been framed makes them compatible with the "orthodoxy" of Indonesian thinking on foreign policy and regional cooperation.

The *democracy-inspired* interpretation of regionalism, to start with, tallies well with Indonesian notions of regional leadership and, surprisingly, even sovereignty. If Shils is right that in developing countries "foreign policy is primarily a policy of 'public relations,' designed not, as in advanced countries, to sustain the security of the state or enhance its power among other states, but to improve the reputation of the nation, to make others heed its voice, to make them pay attention to it and to respect it" (quoted in Weinstein 1976:21), then the democracy narrative precisely fulfills this function. Promoting democracy and human rights in ASEAN, norms enjoying great international recognition, endows Indonesia with respectability and places its claims for regional leadership on an unassailable normative high ground.[36] That Indonesia is currently the only Southeast Asian country rated as democratic by democracy indices further buoys its leadership ambitions. It surrounds Indonesia with an aura of exceptionalism on which Great Powers often build their claims for (moral) superiority and leadership (Prys 2010:491).

Being a regional democracy and human rights promoter endows Indonesia with "soft power," an attribute already salient in precolonial rulers' chronicles (Nguitragool 2012). The Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) launched by the

[34] *The Jakarta Post*, January 3, 2008, p. 21.

[35] Ibid.

[36] For a comprehensive discussion of the impact of democratization on Indonesian foreign policy, see Murphy (2012).

Indonesian government in 2008 precisely pursues this objective.[37] For many legislators, academics, the media, and the government, democracy and human rights promotion are thus less ends in themselves than part of a strategy to enhance Indonesia's regional stature.[38] Promoting and projecting noble norms elevates Indonesia to a role model which others may emulate or from which they may draw inspiration. This is what President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has in mind when he promotes Indonesia as a country which successfully reconciles democracy, modernity, and Islam.[39] The democracy narrative thus complements and ennobles the hitherto prevailing rationales for regional leadership, which primarily rest on physical attributes such as territory and population size.

In Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, leadership is a culturally highly rated concept as its inflationary use suggests. The leader, often depicted as a "father" in familial terms, is a pivotal figure in societies with organicist and corporatist legacies. Indonesia is certainly one of these societies, with corporatist state order reaching a climax during the Suharto era (1966–1998). Although post-Asian Crisis democratization has broken up the institutional mainstays of state corporatism, the collectivist ideology underlying organic state theory and corporatism still lingers in the minds of many Indonesians, albeit often rather unconsciously. It is an ideational source of the strong consensual dimension of Indonesia's democracy, and it can be found in widespread popular aversion against party pluralism, legislatures, and liberal ideology. Finally, leadership also correlates positively with the *bebas-aktif* doctrine. It is the essence of leadership to pursue an active foreign policy, which is characterized by political presence in international issues and arenas, and to act independently from external influence.

A foreign policy promoting democracy and human rights seems to indicate a fundamental departure from the erstwhile uncontested non-interference norm of the ASEAN Way. It also suggests that Indonesia is no longer concerned with infringements on its own national sovereignty and that of other ASEAN member countries. Closer scrutiny reveals that the latter is indeed the case. The Indonesian government has, for instance, repeatedly criticized the Burmese military junta for its dictatorial rule and flagrant human rights violations.[40] But while an interventionist policy may undermine the sovereignty of others, it would strengthen Indonesian sovereignty. As the "cheerleader of democracy"[41] in Southeast Asia, it would be Indonesia that intervenes, while at the same time being immune to interference by fellow ASEAN members. The relaxation of the non-interference norm is thus well compatible with the long-cherished Indonesian ideas about the centrality of national sovereignty in its foreign policy. However, not all contributors to the Charter debate agree that Indonesia is indeed the shining democratic knight in Southeast Asia it claims to be. Scholars, NGO activists, and, occasionally, business representatives have repeatedly criticized this self-congratulatory attitude, arguing that the government must first finish its homework, such as combating endemic corruption, impunity of security agen-

[37] On Indonesia's "soft power," see Opening Statement, H.E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Inaugural Session of Bali Democracy Forum, Nusa Dua, Bali, December 10, 2008 http://balidemocracyforum.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=98:opening-statement-by-he-dr-susilo-bambang-yudhoyono-president-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-at-the-inaugural-session-of-the-bali-democracy-forum&catid=40:article&Itemid=137 (accessed August 14, 2010) and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marty Natalegawa, in *The Jakarta Post,* January 27, 2010.

[38] Referring to the instrumental use of democracy promotion, see Jemadu in *The Jakarta Post*, December 11, 2008, and Sukma in *The Jakarta Post*, December 21, 2009.

[39] See M.H.B. Wirajuda and D. Hendropriyono in *The Jakarta Post*, November 22, 2009.

[40] See, among others, *The Jakarta Post*, February 28, 2008, March 4, 2008, March 15, 2008, March 12, 2010.

[41] *The Jakarta Post*, August 19, 2008.

cies, and harassment of minorities before legitimately becoming a democratic role model in the region.[42] "Indonesia," quipped human rights activist Rafendi Djamin, "is progressive within ASEAN and Asia, but still very conservative at the international level."[43]

The *security-related* interpretation of regionalism and its main theme—the rise of new Asian powers—connect well with the entrenched power sensitivity and the sentiment of vulnerability of Indonesian foreign policy elites. It resonates with the *wayang* (shadow game) topos of the brave ruler who is surrounded by evil forces (Pye 1985:114). President Yudhoyono's metaphor portraying Indonesia as a country that is "navigating a turbulent sea,"[44] also refers to this *topos* (Tan 2007). Greater effectiveness of ASEAN cooperation and deeper regional integration would boost the competitive position of Indonesia and ASEAN in the global economy and strengthen bargaining power in international forums. This has several advantages: ASEAN would serve as an institutional backup for the Indonesian foreign policy agenda and with a united ASEAN Indonesia would become a more significant actor and attractive partner in the eyes of extra-regional powers. The international prestige of Indonesia would increase if it led an organization that has a reputation of effectiveness. At the same time, greater regional cohesion in consonance with a relaxation of the non-interference norm would enable Indonesia to exert greater control over its immediate neighborhood, as envisaged in the concentric circles doctrine. As the regional leader, Indonesia could enhance its influence on the policies of its regional partners, bringing them in line with Indonesian national interest and simultaneously making sure that a more legalistic and rules-based cooperation closes loopholes for non-compliance. In particular, the promotion of democracy and human rights would be more enforceable against recalcitrant fellow members. From the Indonesian perspective, it would thus be more difficult for external Great Powers to wield influence in Southeast Asia, to drive wedges in ASEAN unity, and to challenge ASEAN's centrality in the region.

Finally, the *welfare and social justice*–based interpretation of regionalism resonates with an old source of government legitimacy in Southeast Asia: the creation of a prosperous society. Wealth and prosperity have legitimated precolonial Indonesian kingdoms a well as the Suharto regime. Tellingly, Suharto's New Order collapsed when, due to the AFC, the regime could no longer honor its developmental promises. While the vocal demand of many NGO representatives that the Charter must facilitate the creation of a more prosperous Southeast Asia does not contradict the intentions of the Charter writers, it is accentuated differently. The Charter drafters chiefly focused on economic growth through "trickle down," while their critics seek greater distributional justice. The latter's ideas have their roots in the "cognitive prior," in economic populism such as Sukarno's Marhaenism and the notions of a "people's economy" *(ekonomi kerakyatan),* as well as the cooperative movement and Marxist, Socialist, and *dependencia* traditions of various shades. Most of this thought had been suppressed by the Suharto regime, but—except for full-fledged Marxism—has staged a revival in the *Era Reformasi*. Yet all these antiliberal economic ideas tally well with the organicist and collectivist state theory of pre- and postcolonial Indonesia. They dovetail the collectivist provisions of the Indonesian Constitution and the anticolonial sentiments of the early Republic where liberal capitalism was regarded as essentially exploitative and a vehicle of colonial subjugation (Weinstein 1976).

[42] See M. Masaya in *The Jakarta Post*, December 11, 2008, and December 21, 2009, and KADIN executive John A. Prasetio in *The Jakarta Post*, September 29, 2009.

[43] Cited in Sukma (2011:116).

[44] See*, The Jakarta Post,* January 2, 2007.

Pruning

To make ideas and norms compatible with the "cognitive prior," they have to be pruned. In other words, some elements of the original idea have to be cut and left out in the new ideational amalgam. In order to localize the norms seemingly associated with an alien European type of regional integration, Indonesian stakeholders had to prune both the foreign ideas and the orthodoxy of the ASEAN Way. They did so in three respects.

First, and most significantly, they removed from the European model the supranational dimension. Although many Indonesian stakeholders vocally lobbied for ASEAN reforms transcending pure intergovernmentalism, there is no genuine movement toward the establishment of supranational bodies. Proposals such as majority voting, sanctions against non-complying members, and a stronger secretariat may, if implemented, have a centralizing effect on ASEAN, but they do not entail a transfer of sovereignty to a higher level of decision making as implied in Haas' classical definition (Haas 1958). Yet, as we have seen, a majority of ASEAN member governments have actively prevented such centralizing reforms.

Second, pruning also occurred with regard to the idealist underpinnings of European thinking on regional cooperation. For many Indonesian stakeholders, regional cooperation is not primarily driven by the functional need to solve or mitigate cross-border problems, a major rationale for deepening regional integration stressed in the liberal European discourse. Quite to the contrary, Wanandi, for instance, stressed the important role of the state—not of regional cooperation arrangements—in the management of interdependence.[45]

Third, the ASEAN Way has also been pruned. Many of the reforms Indonesian stakeholders supported in the ASEAN Charter debate would weaken, although not completely abolish, the non-interference norm. Due to the leadership role Indonesia envisaged for itself, it would not mind sovereignty losses of ASEAN fellow members, but much less would Indonesian foreign policy elites tolerate the interference of others into their country's internal affairs. In other words, Indonesian elites are carefully calibrating the concept of regional integration in a way that ensures that it will never jeopardize national interest.

Localizing Regionalism, the ASEAN Charter, and the Resurgence of Indonesian Nationalism

Localization is an amalgam of new and old ideas, a new third. Although it cannot be discounted that under favorable conditions localization may be a transitional stage in a trajectory of wholesale ideational transformation, it normally modernizes and thereby revitalizes major elements of the "cognitive prior." This is also what happened with the appropriation of European ideas of regional integration in the Indonesian debate on the ASEAN Charter. The appropriated European ideas have been made compatible with the ASEAN Way and age-honored Indonesian foreign policy doctrines. In fact, one may argue that a Southeast Asian regionalism with European institutional traits is chiefly a vehicle facilitating Indonesia's ambitions for regional leadership and a more salient international role.

This assessment is corroborated by a powerful resurgence of nationalism, a frequent occurrence in new democracies as argued by Snyder (Snyder 2000). Indonesia's neonationalist turn is a response to half a decade of humiliation and dramatic decline in the aftermath of the AFC and shared by most foreign policy stakeholders. Even advocacy NGOs join this discourse as their strong penchant

[45] *The Jakarta Post,* May 6, 2008.

for economic nationalism suggests. As a consequence of the severity of the AFC, Indonesia had to subscribe to IMF conditionalities, while the East Timor debacle, separatist rebellions, endemic domestic violence, and terrorist attacks gave rise to widespread concerns that the country was on the verge of becoming a failing state. But the nationalist resurgence is also driven by a sense of pride over Indonesia's more recent achievements: the successful democratic transition, the economic recovery, the advances in fighting terrorism, and the pacification of most separatist rebellions. These accomplishments, in consonance with the country's size, have spurred Indonesian elites' self-confidence and revitalized their regional leadership claims.[46]

That nationalism is the driving force of Indonesia's current foreign policy agenda, and that, including NGOs, Indonesian foreign policy elites instrumentalize regionalism for the country's leadership claims, is affirmed by Indonesia's response to two intensively discussed issues: the dispute with Malaysia over the resource-rich Ambalat Block in the Sulawesi Sea and the economic consequences of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). Both issues have strongly spurred nationalist sentiments. While in the Ambalat dispute, most Indonesian foreign policy stakeholders plead for *bilateral* negotiations, and *not* the recourse to regional dispute settlement mechanisms, even moderate observers, including legislators, scholars, and government representatives, do not completely rule out military force should diplomacy fail to achieve desired results. For Indonesians, such results can only consist in the recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over the contested maritime area. The old duality of *diplomasi* and *perjuangan* is reconstituted in this response. Ultra-nationalist circles, including legislators, even used the dispute with Malaysia for a rehearsal of *konfrontasi* rhetoric. The slogan of *"Ganyang Malaysia" (Crush Malaysia),*[47] emotional rhetoric accusing the Malaysian government of trampling Indonesian dignity, the burning of Malaysian flags, the mobilization of volunteers to fight against Malaysia, and comparisons of Indonesian and Malaysian military firepower even in serious political magazines[48] are part of a nationalistic hype which overarches the regionalism discourse.

No less nationalistic was the response of large parts of the Indonesian public to the full implementation of the ACFTA on January 1, 2010. Business organizations especially, supported by labor unions, members of the academe and even government representatives, demanded a renegotiation of the agreement because they believed that heightened Chinese competition is detrimental to Indonesia's economy.[49] When China and ASEAN partners ruled out renegotiation, business representatives pleaded for the erection of non-tariff trade barriers in order to avoid a flooding of the Indonesian market with what they discredited as cheap and substandard Chinese products.[50] The strong nationalist backlash has forced Indonesian authorities to resort to a defensive discursive strategy which seeks to legitimize new neoliberal ideas by framing them in the language of the protectionist ideational orthodoxy (Chandra 2011).

The two episodes demonstrate that a majority of Indonesian stakeholders only subscribe to the idea of legalizing regional governance if Indonesia expects to benefit from it. Both issues also suggest that Indonesia's *bebas-aktif* doctrine still dominates the country's foreign policy agenda and that the doctrine's inherent

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[46] See also Weatherbee (2005).

[47] *Kompas,* September 4, 2009, p. 6; *DetikNews*, August 30, 2010; *Tempo Interaktif,* March 6, 2005, March 10, 2005, March 14, 2005, September 3, 2010.

[48] *Tempo Interaktif,* March 8, 2005.

[49] *Tempo Interaktif,* August 12, 2009; December 1, 2009; *The Jakarta Post*, April 5, 2010.

[50] *Jakarta Post,* January 2, 2010 and March 5, 2010; *Kabar Bisnis*, May 18, 2011 http://www.kabarbisnis.com/read/2820369 (accessed June 12, 2011).

predilection for utmost flexibility stands in the way of a more rule-based process of regional integration.

Conclusion

This article has shown that since the AFC and the fall of the Suharto regime, Indonesian foreign policymaking has become more pluralistic and transparent than in the past. At the same time, major tenets of regional cooperation as embodied in the ASEAN Way have come under scrutiny. Indonesian foreign policy stakeholders began to increasingly question the non-interference norm. Many of them pleaded for reforms that seemed to appropriate European concepts of regional integration. Yet, the article also showed that European ideational imports have been reconstructed in a way that they become compatible with the "cognitive prior" of the ASEAN Way and Indonesian foreign policy doctrines and practices. Virtually, all stakeholder groups regard a reformed Southeast Asian regionalism in the first place as a vehicle to support Indonesian regional leadership claims and ambitions for a greater international role. These aspirations are driven by a resurgent nationalism which reflects recent experiences of vulnerability. A seemingly Europeanized regionalism provides the ideational blend which refines, modernizes, and revalidates a foreign policy which is much more impregnated by a nationalist agenda than by liberal concepts of collective action and interstate cooperation. These norms are actively projected into the wider region, thereby, in fact, challenging the European model of regional integration and indicating that norm diffusion is not only a one-way, but rather a two-way process. Far from making regionalism more similar, the normative underpinnings of Indonesian regionalism suggest that regionalisms across the world differ.

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